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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
“Banks Remain the Top Target for Hackers, Report Says,” is the
title of an April 2013 American Banker article.2
Yet, no new
* The author is a cyber-security policy analyst in the banking industry and a digital
forensics examiner in private practice. Mr. Harrington is a graduate with honors from
Taft Law School, and holds the CCFP, MCSE, CISSP, CHFI, and CSOXP certifications.
He has served on the board of the Minnesota Chapter of the High Technology Crime
Investigation Association, is a current member of Infragard, the Financial Services
Roundtable’s legislative and regulatory working groups, FS-ISAC, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce “Cyber Working Group,” the Fourth District Ethics Committee in Minnesota,
and is a council member of the Minnesota State Bar Association’s Computer &
Technology Law Section. Mr. Harrington teaches computer forensics for Century
College in Minnesota, and recently contributed a chapter on the Code of Ethics for the
forthcoming Official (ISC)²® Guide to the Cyber Forensics Certified Professional
CBK®. He is also an instructor for the CCFP certification.
1

RUSH, The Body Electric, on GRACE UNDER PRESSURE (Mercury Records 1984).

2

Sean Sposito, Banks Remain the Top Target for Hackers, Report Says, AM. BANKER
(April 23, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_78/banksremain-the-top-target-for-hackers-report-says-1058543-1.html.
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comprehensive U.S. cyber legislation has been enacted since 2002,3 and
neither legislative history nor the statutory language of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) or Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) make reference to the Internet.4 Courts have nevertheless filled in
the gaps—sometimes with surprising results.
[2]
Because state law, federal legislative proposals, and case law all
are in a continuing state of flux, practitioners have found it necessary to
follow these developments carefully, forecast, and adapt to them, all of
which has proved quite challenging. As the title of this Comment
suggests, deploying sound cyber security practices is not only equally as
3

ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 3 (2013),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf (discussing, for example, the
Federal Information Security Management Act).
4

See Yonatan Lupu, The Wiretap Act and Web Monitoring: A Breakthrough for Privacy
Rights?, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2004) (discussing the use of the ECPA and the
lack of words such as “Internet,” “World Wide Web,” and “e-commerce” in the text or
legislative history); see also Eric C. Bosset et al., Private Actions Challenging Online
Data Collection Practices Are Increasing: Assessing the Legal Landscape, INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J., Feb. 2011, at 3 (“[F]ederal statutes such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) . . . were drafted
long before today’s online environment could be envisioned . . . .”); Miguel Helft &
Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun by the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/10privacy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1
& (noting that Congress enacted the ECPA before the World Wide Web or widespread
use of e-mail); Orin S. Kerr, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A User's Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208, 1213-14, 1229-30 (2004); see generally The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Privacy in the Digital Age:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/ecpa.pdf (“[D]etermining how best to bring this
privacy law into the Digital Age will be one of Congress's greatest challenges. . . . [The]
ECPA is a law that is hampered by conflicting standards that cause confusion for law
enforcement, the business community, and American consumers alike.”).
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challenging, but also “risky,” which may seem counterintuitive in light of
the fact that intent of cyber security programs is to manage risk, not create
it.5
[3]
Cyber security risks concern exploits made possible by
technological advances, some of which are styled with familiar catchphrases: “e-Discovery,” “social media,” “cloud computing,”
“Crowdsourcing,” and “big data,” to name a few. Yet, long before the
term “cloud computing” became part of contemporary parlance, Picasa
used to store photos in the cloud (where the “cloud” is a metaphor for the
Internet).6 This author has been using Hotmail since 1997 (another form
of cloud computing). As the foregoing examples illustrate, the neologisms
were long predated by their underlying concepts.
[4]
One of the latest techno-phrases du jour is “hack back.”7 The
concept isn’t new, and the term has been “common” parlance at least as
far back as 2003.8 “Hack back”—sometimes termed “active defense,”
“back hacking,” “retaliatory hacking,” or “offensive countermeasures”
(“OCM”)—has been defined as the
5

See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4 (Version 1.0, 2014) available at
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf
(describing The Framework as “a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity risk”).
6

See, Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAGAZINE (May 13, 2013)
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp.
7

See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, A New Brand of Cyber Security: Hacking the Hackers, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/04/business/la-fi-cyberdefense-20121204/2 (proposing that “companies should be able to ‘hack back’ by, for
example, disabling servers that host cyber attacks”).
8

See, e.g., Scott Carle, Crossing the Line: Ethics for the Security Professional, SANS
INST. (2003), http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/hackers/crossing-lineethics-security-professional-890. Readers, doubtless, will know of earlier references.
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“process of identifying attacks on a system and, if possible,
identifying the origin of the attacks.” Back hacking can be
thought of as a kind of reverse engineering of hacking
efforts, where security consultants and other professionals
try to anticipate attacks and work on adequate responses.”9
A more accurate and concise definition might be “turning the tables on a
cyberhacking assailant: thwarting or stopping the crime, or perhaps even
trying to steal back what was taken.”10 One private security firm,
renowned for its relevant specialization, defines active defense, in
pertinent part, as “deception, containment, tying up adversary resources,
and creating doubt and confusion while denying them the benefits of their
operations.”11 Some have proposed—or carried out—additional measures,
such as “photographing the hacker using his own system’s camera,
implanting malware in the hacker’s network, or even physically disabling
or destroying the hacker’s own computer or network.”12
9

TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23172/back-hack (last visited June
28, 2014); see also NETLINGO, http://www.netlingo.com/word/back-hack.php (last
visited June 28, 2014) (“[Back-hack is t]he reverse process of finding out who is hacking
into a system. Attacks can usually be traced back to a computer or pieced together from
‘electronic bread crumbs’ unknowingly left behind by a cracker.”).
10

Melissa Riofrio, Hacking Back: Digital Revenge Is Sweet but Risky, PCWORLD (May
9, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2038226/hacking-back-digitalrevenge-is-sweet-but-risky.html.
11

Dmitri Alperovitch, Active Defense: Time for a New Security Strategy, CROWDSTRIKE
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/active-defense-time-new-securitystrategy/.
12

COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 81
(2013) [hereinafter THE IP COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf; see also Sam Cook,
Georgia Outs Russian Hacker, Takes Photo with His Own Webcam, GEEK (Oct. 31,
2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.geek.com/news/georgia-outs-russian-hacker-takes-photowith-his-own-webcam-1525485/. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Thinking

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

[5]
Back hacking has been a top-trending technology topic over the
past year, prompted in part by the controversial Report of the Commission
on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (“IP Commission
Report”),13 and has been debated on blogs, symposium panels, editorials,
and news media forums by information security professionals and lawyers
alike. One with the potential to grab practitioners’ attention was a panel of
attorneys David Navetta and Ron Raether—both well regarded in the
information security community—discussing the utility and propriety of
such practices. One opined that, if the circumstance is exigent enough, a
company may take “measures into [its] own hands,” and that it would,
“not likely be prosecuted under the CFAA, depending on the exigency of
the circumstances.”14 The other reasoned that hack back “technically
violates the law, but is anyone going to prosecute you for that?
Unlikely.”15 He noted, “[i]t provides a treasure trove of forensic
information that you can use,” and continued, “[w]ith respect to the more
extreme end of hack back, where you are actually going to shut down
servers, I think there is a necessity element to it—an exigency: if
someone’s life is threatened, if it appears that there is going to be a
monumental effect on the company, then it might be justified.”16 In 2014
Through Active Defense in Cyberspace, in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring
Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy
327, 328 (The National Academies Press ed., 2010) (“Counterstrikes of this nature have
already been occurring on the Internet over the last decade, by both government and
private actors, and full software packages designed to enable counterstriking have also
been made commercially available, even though such counterstrikes are of questionable
legality”).
13

See THE IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12.

14

Tom Fields, To ‘Hack Back’ or Not?, BANKINFOSECURITY (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/to-hack-back-or-not-a-5545.
15

Id.

16

Id.
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at the most recent RSA conference, where the “hackback” debate
continued, the presentation was billed, in part, with the proposition,
“[a]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse set of techniques along a
spectrum of varying risk and legality.”17 And, other commentators have
urged that “offensive operations must be considered as a possible device
in the cyber toolkit.” 18
[6]
Most commentators and scholars, however, seem to agree that
“hack back” is not only “risky,” but is also not a viable option for a variety
of reasons.19 Hack backs and other surreptitious cyber acts incur the risks
of criminal liability, civil liability, regulatory liability, professional
discipline, compromise of corporate ethics, injury to brand image, and
escalation. One practitioner quoted by the LA Times exclaimed, “[i]t's not
only legally wrong, it's morally wrong.”20 James Andrew Lewis, a senior
17

Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private Sector, RSA
CONF. (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:20 AM),
http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us14/agenda/sessions/1146/hackback-claptrap-anactive-defense-continuum-for.
18

Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett, & Anand Shah, Adequate Attribution: A Framework
for Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 1 (2013) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol8/iss1/3
19

See, e.g., Rafal Los, Another Reason Hacking Back Is Probably a Bad Idea,
INFOSECISLAND (June 20, 2013), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/23228Another-Reason-Hacking-Back-is-Probably-a-Bad-Idea.html; Riofrio, supra note 10.
20

Dilanian, supra note 7; see also William Jackson, The Hack-Back vs. The Rule of Law:
Who Wins?, CYBEREYE, (May 31, 2013, 9:39 AM)
http://gcn.com/blogs/cybereye/2013/00/hacking-back-vs-the-rule-of-law.aspx (stating
“[i]n the face of increasing cyber threats there is an understandable pent-up desire for an
active response, but this response should not cross legal thresholds. In the end, we either
have the rule of law or we don’t. That others do not respect this rule does not excuse us
from observing it. Admittedly this puts public- and private-sector organizations and
individuals at a short-term disadvantage while correcting the situation, but it’s a pill we
will have to swallow.”).

6
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fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, characterized
hacking back as “a remarkably bad idea that would harm the national
interest.”21 The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, a major
cybersecurity bill passed by the House in April 2013, contained an
amendment that specifically provided that the bill did not permit hacking
back.22
Representative Jim Langevin (RI-D), who authored the
amendment, explained, “[w]ithout this clear restriction, there is simply too
much risk of potentially dangerous misattribution or misunderstanding of
any hack-back actions.”23 Further, the private security firm renowned for
its active defense strategies, mentioned ante, has attempted to distance
itself from the phrases such as “hack back” and “retaliatory hacking,”
preferring instead the broader phrase “active defense.”24 Another example
of the importance of subtleties in word choice may be “Countermeasure,”
where some appear to have conflated the word with the concept of active
defense.25
21

James Andrew Lewis, Private Retaliation in Cyberspace, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES (May 22, 2013), http://csis.org/publication/private-retaliation-cyberspace.
22

See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (2013).

23

Christopher M. Matthews, Support Grows to Let Cybertheft Victims 'Hack Back',
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2013, 9:33 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578517374103394466
.
24

See Alperovitch, supra note 11. The firm’s online marketing literature includes the
following: “Active Defense is NOT about ‘hack-back,’ retaliation, or vigilantism . . . we
are fundamentally against these tactics and believe they can be counterproductive, as well
as potentially illegal.” Id.; see also Paul Roberts, Don’t Call It a Hack Back:
Crowdstrike Unveils Falcon Platform, SECURITY LEDGER (June 19, 2013, 11:47 AM),
https://securityledger.com/2013/06/dont-call-it-a-hack-back-crowdstrike-unveils-falconplatform/.
25

Charlie Mitchell, Senate Judiciary Panel Will Examine Stronger Penalties for Cyber
Crimes and Espionage, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (May 9, 2014)
http://insidecybersecurity.com/Cyber-Daily-News/Daily-News/senate-judiciary-panelwill-examine-stronger-penalties-for-cyber-crimes-and-espionage/menu-id-1075.html

7
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II. ACTIVE DEFENSE APPROACHES
[7]
Self-defense is not an abstraction created by civilization, but a law
spawned by nature itself, and has been justified since antiquity. 26 It has
been regarded since the early modern period as available to redress
injuries against a state’s sovereign rights.27 There is little question cyberattacks against a designated critical infrastructure are attacks against a
state’s sovereign rights,28 because much of civilian infrastructure is both a
military and national asset.29 Accordingly, the focus of 2014 NATO
(stating “[a]uthorization for so-called countermeasures is included in the draft cyber
information-sharing and liability protection bill . . . White House and Department of
Homeland Security officials . . . declined to discuss the administration's view of
deterrence issues such as active defense.”). To be distinguished from OCM,
“countermeasure” is defined in the draft Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Act of 2014
as “an action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure applied to an information
system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system
that prevents or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability.” See H.R. 624.
26

See, e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Speech of M.T. Cicero in Defence of Titus
Annius Milo, in THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 390, 392-393 (C.D. Yonge
trans., 1913).
27

Sheng Li, Note, When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?,
38 YALE J. INT'L L. 179, 182 (2013).
28

See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129-31
(1999).
29

See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT SUPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORIZATION AND PERSONNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991 (PUBLIC LAW 102-25) N-1
(1992) (“Civilian employees, despite seemingly insurmountable logistical problems,
unrelenting pressure, and severe time constraints, successfully accomplished what this
nation asked of them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of excellence and
professionalism.”).

8
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International Conference on Cyber Conflict (“CyCon”) is active cyber
defense, including implications for critical infrastructure.30 Likewise, a
project sponsored by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of
Excellence is set to publish a report in 2016 that establishes acceptable
responses to pedestrian or quotidian cyber-attacks against nations, whereas
its predecessor, regarded as an academic text, focused on cyber-attacks
against a country that are physically disruptive or injurious to people and
possible responses under the UN charter and military rules.31 Both works
are based on the concepts of self-defense and, under certain circumstances,
preemptive “anticipatory self-defense.”32
[8]
The questions that scholars, policymakers, information security
experts, and corporate executives have struggled with, however, is at what
threshold do such attacks warrant the protection of the state, 33 whether a
private corporation may respond in lieu of or in concert with protection by
the state, and to what extent such collusion constitutes excessive
entanglement between the private and public sector. Implicit in these
questions is whether the government is willing and able to develop a
30

See CYCON, http://ccdcoe.org/cycon/index.html (last visited July 16, 2014).

31

See NATO COOP. CYBER DEFENCE CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 4 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2013); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51 (governing the modern law of selfdefense).
32

See, e.g., Keiko Kono, Briefing Memo: Cyber Security and the Tallinn Manual, NAT’L
INST. FOR DEF. STUDIES NEWS, Oct. 2013, at 2, available at
www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2013/briefing_e180.pdf.
33

See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman & Danny Yadron, Banks Seek U.S. Help on Iran
Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324734904578244302923178548
; Christopher J. Castelli, DOJ Official Urges Public-Private Cybersecurity Partnership
Amid Legal Questions, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (April 1, 2014),
http://insidecybersecurity.com/Cyber-Daily-News/Daily-News/doj-official-urges-publicprivate-cybersecurity-partnership-amid-legal-questions/menu-id-1075.html.

9
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modern and adaptable regulatory and criminal law framework and to
allocate adequate law enforcement resources to confront the problem.34
Because, at the time of this writing, it is widely perceived that the
government is not yet willing and able,35 victims often do not report
suspected or actual cyber-attacks, and have resorted to inappropriate selfhelp, deploying their own means of investigating and punishing
transgressors.36 As one commentator posits,
With regard to computer crime, some might argue that the
entire investigative process be outsourced to the business
community. Historically, the privatization of investigations
has assisted public law enforcement by allowing them to
concentrate on other responsibilities, and has prevented

34

One such example is the “Computer Trespasser” exception added by Congress to the
Wiretap Act, which allows law enforcement officials to monitor the activities of hackers
when (1) the owner or operator of the network authorizes the interception; (2) law
enforcement is engaged in a lawful investigation; (3) law enforcement has reasonable
grounds to believe the contents of the communications will be relevant to that
investigation; and (4) such interception does not acquire communications other than those
transmitted to or from the hacker. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i)(I)-(IV) (2012); see also
Bradley J. Schaufenbuel, The Legality of Honeypots, ISSA J., April 2008, at 16, 19,
available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-legality-of-honeypots-50070/.
35

See, e.g., David E. Sanger, White House Details Thinking on Cybersecurity Flaws,
New York Times, (April 28, 2014) (discussing the Government’s admission that it
refrains from disclosing major computer sercurity vulnerabilities that could be useful to
“thwart a terrorist attack, stop the theft of our nation’s intellectual property, or even
discover more dangerous vulnerabilities that are being used by hackers or other
adversaries to exploit our networks.”)
36

See Sameer Hinduja, Computer Crime Investigations in the United States: Leveraging
Knowledge from the Past to Address the Future, 1 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16
(2007) (citation omitted).

10

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

their resources from being allocated in too sparse a manner
to be useful.” 37
Awaiting the ultimate resolution of these questions, American
corporations have developed an array of active defense tactics. Below are
a few of the more common examples of those, and the corresponding
challenges:
A. Beaconing
[9]
Beaconing is one of the most cited active defense techniques, and
one mentioned in the IP Commission Report (along with “meta-tagging,”
and “watermarking”) as a way to enhance electronic files to “allow for
awareness of whether protected information has left an authorized network
and can potentially identify the location of files in the event that they are
stolen.”38 A benign version of beaconing is the use of so-called Web
bugs.39 A Web bug is a link—a surreptitious file object—commonly used
by spammers and placed in an e-mail message or e-mail attachment,
which, when opened, will cause the e-mail client or program will attempt
to retrieve an image file object from a remote Web server and, in the
37

Id. at 19. But see Kesan & Hayes, supra, note 12 at 33 (“there is a more significant
downside of entrusting active defense to private firms. Our model addressing the optimal
use of active defense emphasizes that there are threshold points where permitting
counterstrikes would be the socially optimal solution. However, it does not define these
thresholds, and determining these thresholds requires some sort of standardization. It
would be unwise to allow individual companies to make these decisions on a case by case
basis.”)
38

THE IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 81. See also Joseph Menn, Hacked
Companies Fight Back With Controversial Steps, REUTERS, June 18, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/18/us-media-tech-summit-cyber-strikebackidUSBRE85G07S20120618
39

See Stephanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concerns, CNET
(July 12, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-243077.html.

11
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process, transmit information that includes the user’s IP address and other
information.40 This transmission is not possible “if the user did not
preconfigure the e-mail client or program to refrain from retrieving images
or HTML content from the Internet,” or if the user’s e-mail client blocks
externally-hosted images by default.41 “This information becomes
available to the sender either through an automated report service (e.g.,
ReadNotify.com) or simply by monitoring traffic to the Web server.”42 In
one project demonstrating the use advocated by the IP Commission
Report, researchers employed such technology in decoy documents to
track possible misuse of confidential documents.43 So, is beaconing legal?
[10] The Wall Street Journal (the “Journal”) quoted Drexel University
law professor Harvey Rishikof—who also is co-chairman of the American
Bar Association’s Cybersecurity Legal Task Force—as saying the legality
of beaconing is not entirely clear.44 Rishikof is quoted as saying,
“‘[t]here's the black-letter law, and there's the gray area. . . . Can you put a
beacon on your data? Another level is, could you put something on your
data that would perform a more aggressive action if the data was

40

See id. See also John Gilroy, Ask The Computer Guy, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at
H07 (describing web bugs in lay parlance).
41

Sean L. Harrington, Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag
Team or Disastrous Duo?, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 353, 363 (2011), available at
http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/7.Harrington.pdf.
42

Id.

43

See generally Brian M. Bowen et al., Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents,
COLUM. UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI. (2009), available at
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/2009/DecoyDocumentsSECCOM09.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2014) (introducing and discussing properties of decoys as a guide to
design “trap-based defenses” to better detect the likelihood of insider attacks).
44

See Matthews, supra note 23.

12
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taken?’”45 The article went on to suggest more aggressive strategies such
as “inserting code that would cause stolen data to self-destruct or inserting
a program in the data that would allow a company to seize control of any
cameras on the computers where the data were being stored.”46 The
Journal, citing an anonymous Justice Department source, further reported
that, “[i]n certain circumstances beaconing could be legal, as long as the
concealed software wouldn't do other things like allow a company to
access information on the system where the stolen data were stored.”47
[11] Another important consideration is the fact that beaconing may fall
within one of the active defense definitions (supra) as “deception.”48
Although deception is recognized as both a common and effective
investigative technique,49 the problem is the possibility that the activities
of the investigator could be imputed under Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.3 to one or more attorneys responsible for directing or
approving of those activities.50 Under Model Rule 8.4(c), neither an
attorney nor an attorney’s agent under his or her direction or control may
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See Harrington, supra note 41, at 362-64.

49

The Supreme Court has tacitly approved deception as a valid law enforcement
technique in investigations and interrogations. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297
(1990) (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception . . .”); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) (“Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are
necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.”); Allan Lengel, Fed Agents Going
Undercover on Social Networks Like Facebook, AOLNEWS (Mar. 28, 2010, 5:55 PM),
http://www.ticklethewire.com/2010/03/28/fed-agents-going-undercover-on-socialnetworks-like-facebook/.
50

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013).
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misrepresentation.”51 Although the question of whether deception, as
contemplated in Rule 8.4, exists in the context of incident response or
network forensics investigations is not well settled,52 most states have held
“[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.”53 A few state bar
associations have already addressed similar technology-related ethical
pitfalls.
The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance
Committee advised in Opinion 2009–02 that an attorney who asks an
agent (such as an investigator) to “friend” a party in Facebook in order to
obtain access to that party’s non-public information, would violate, among
others, Rule 5.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.54
Likewise, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics issued Formal Opinion 2010–2, which
provides that a lawyer violates, among others, New York Rules of
51

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c); see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action
Against Carlson, No. A13-1091 (Minn. July 11, 2013) (public reprimand for “falsely
posing as a former client of opposing counsel and posting a negative review about
opposing counsel on a website, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.4(a) and
8.4(c)”); In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002) (disciplining a prosecutor, who
impersonated a public defender in an attempt to induce the surrender of a murder suspect,
for an act of deception that violated the Rules of Professional Conduct).
52

See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Muddy Waters: Spyware’s Legal and Ethical
Implications, GPSOLO MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2006,
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_
magazine_index/spywarelegalethicalimplications.html (“The legality of spyware is
murky, at best. The courts have spoken of it only infrequently, so there is precious little
guidance.”).
53

In re Disciplinary Action Against Zotaley, 546 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1996) (quoting
MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3 cmt. 3 (2005)).
54

See PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROF’L GUIDANCE COMM., Op. 2009-02, at 1-2 (2009),
available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerRe
sources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
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Professional Conduct Rule 5.3, if an attorney employs an agent to engage
in the deception of “friending” a party under false pretenses to obtain
evidence from a social networking website.55
B. Threat Counter-Intelligence Gathering
[12] One of the most seemingly-innocuous active defense activities is
intelligence gathering. Security analyst David Bianco defines threat
intelligence as “[c]onsuming information about adversaries, tools or
techniques and applying this to incoming data to identify malicious
activity.”56 Threat intelligence gathering ranges from everything from
reverse malware analysis and attribution to monitoring inbound and
outbound corporate e-mail to more risky endeavors.57 Some security
55

See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N PROF’L & JUDICIAL ETHICS COMM., Formal Op. 2010-2 (2010),
available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/show_html.php?rid=1134; cf.
Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in Government
Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 11, ¶ 21 n.76 (2013) (citing similar ethics opinions rendered by bar committees
in New York State and San Diego County).
56

David Bianco, Use of the Term “Intelligence” in the RSA 2014 Expo, ENTERPRISE
DETECTION & RESPONSE (Feb. 28, 2014) http://detectrespond.blogspot.com/#!/2014/03/use-of-term-intelligence-at-rsa.html.
57

See Sameer, supra note 36, at 15 (citing A. Meehan, G. Manes, L. Davis, J. Hale & S.
Shenoi, Packet Sniffing for Automated Chat Room Monitoring and Evidence
Preservation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2001 IEEE WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION
ASSURANCE AND SECURITY 285, 285 (2001)) (“[T]he monitoring of bulletin-boards and
chat-rooms by investigators has led to the detection and apprehension of those who
participate in sex crimes against children.”), available at http://indexof.es/Sniffers/Sniffers_pdf/52463601-packet-sniffing-for-automated-chat-room74909.pdf; see, e.g., Kimberly J. Mitchell, Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Police
Posing as Juveniles Online to Catch Sex Offenders: Is It Working?, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J.
RES. & TREATMENT 241 (2005); Lyta Penna, Andrew Clark & George Mohay,
Challenges of Automating the Detection of Paedophile Activity on the Internet, in
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital
Forensic Engineering (2005), available at
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/20860/1/penna2005sadfe.pdf.
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experts claim to frequent “Internet store fronts” for malware, “after
carefully cloaking [their] identity to remain anonymous.”58 The reality,
however, is that gaining access to and remaining on these black market
fora requires the surreptitious visitor either to: (1) participate (“pay to
play”); (2) to have developed a reputation over months or years, or
founded the underground forum ab initio; or (3) to have befriended or
been extended a personal invitation by an established member. The first
two of these three activities implies that the participant would have coconspirator or accomplice liability in the underlying crimes. Another risk
is, if the site is reputed to also purvey child pornography, a court may find
that the site visitor acquired possession (even as temporary Internet cache)
of the contraband knowingly, even if the true intent of lurking was to
gather intelligence.59 Another obvious risk is that surreptitious monitoring
of hacker sites using false credentials or representations is an act of
deception which, for the reasons more fully set forth above, could create
disciplinary liability for any attorneys who are involved or acquiesce to
the activity.

58

Martin Moylan, Target’s Data Breach Link to ‘the Amazon of Stolen Credit Card
Information’, MPRNEWS (February 3, 2014),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/02/02/stolen-credit-and-debit-card-numbers-arejust-a-few-clicks-away.
59

See “Investigating the Dark Web — The Challenges of Online Anonymity for Digital
Forensics Examiners,” FORENSIC FOCUS (July 28, 2014) (“It is certainly easier to access
indecent images of children and similar content on the dark net.”) Available at
http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2014/07/28/investigating-the-dark-web-the-challengesof-online-anonymity-for-digital-forensics-examiners/. And see, e.g., MINN. STAT. §
617.247 subd. 4(a) (2013) (criminalizing possession of “a pornographic work [involving
minors] or a computer disk or computer or other electronic, magnetic, or optical storage
system or a storage system of any other type, containing a pornographic work, knowing
or with reason to know its content and character”).
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C. Sinkholing
[13] Sinkholing is the impersonation of a botnet command-and-control
server in order to intercept and receive malicious traffic from its clients.60
To accomplish this, either the domain registrar must redirect the domain
name to the investigator’s machine (which only works when the
connection is based on a DNS name), or the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) must redirect an existing IP address to the investigator’s machine
(possible only if the investigator’s machine is located in the IP range of
the same provider), or the ISP must redirect all traffic destined for an IP
address to the investigator’s machine, instead (the “walled garden”
approach).61
[14] Sinkholing involves the same issues of deception discussed ante,
but also relies on the domain registrar’s willingness and legal ability to
assist. As Link and Sancho point out in their paper Lessons Learned
While Sinkholing Botnets—Not as Easy as it Looks!, “[u]nless there is a
court order that compels them to comply with such a request, without the
explicit consent of the owner/end-user of the domain, the registrar is
unable to grant such requests.”62 Doubtless they were referring to the
Wiretap Act (Title 1 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act),
which generally prohibits unconsented interception (contemporaneous
with transmission), disclosure, or use of electronic communications.63
60

See Rainer Link & David Sancho, Lessons Learned While Sinkholing Botnets—Not As
Easy As It Looks!, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE 106, 106
(2011), available at http://www.trendmicro.com/media/misc/lessons-learnedvirusbulletin-conf-en.pdf.
61

Id.

62

Id. at 107.

63

“[C]onsent may be demonstrated through evidence of appropriate notice to users
through service terms, privacy policies or similar disclosures that inform users of the
potential for monitoring.” Bosset et.al, supra note 4 (citing Mortensen v. Bresnan
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Further, a federal district court recently ruled that intentionally
circumventing an IP address blacklist in order to crawl an otherwisepublicly available website constitutes “access without authorization”
under the CFAA.64 Link and Sancho continue that registrars have little
incentive to assist because it does not generate revenue, and note that
sinkholing invites distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) retaliation which
could affect other customers of a cloud-provided broadband connection.65
Finally, sinkholing is likely to collect significant amounts of data,
including personally identifiable information (“PII”).
The entity
collecting PII is likely to be subject to the data privacy, handling, and
disclosure laws of all the jurisdictions whence the data came.
D. Honeypots
[15] A honeypot is defined as “a computer system on the Internet that is
expressly set up to attract and ‘trap’ people who attempt to penetrate other
people’s computer systems.”66 It may be best thought of as “an
information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use
of that resource.”67 Honeypots do arguably involve deception, but have
been in use for a comparatively long time, and are generally accepted as a
valid information security tactic (therefore, relatively free from
controversy). The legal risks, historically, have been identified as: (1)
Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 5140454, at *3-5 (D. Mont. Dec.
13, 2010)).
64

See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182-83 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

65

See Link & Sancho, supra note 60, at 107-08.

66

Honeypot, SEARCHSECURITY, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/honey-pot
(last visited June 29, 2014).
67

Eric Cole & Stephen Northcutt, Honeypots: A Security Manager's Guide to Honeypots,
SANS INST., http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/honeypots-guide
(last visited May 13, 2014).
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potential violations of the ECPA;68 and (2) possibly creating an
entrapment defense for the intruder.69 Neither of these is applicable here,
because, respectively: (1) the context of the deployment discussed herein
is the corporate entity as the honeypot owner (thus, a party to the wire
communication); and (2) the corporate entity is not an agent of law
enforcement, and, further, the entrapment defense is only available when
defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime (here, a hacker
intruding into a honeypot is predisposed).70 Nevertheless, Justice
Department attorney Richard Salgado, speaking at the Black Hat
Briefings, did reportedly warn that the law regarding honeypots is
“untested” and that entities implementing devices or networks designed to
attract hackers could face such legal issues as liability for an attack
launched from a compromised honeypot.71 This possibility was discussed
six years ago:
If a hacker compromises a system in which the owner has
not taken reasonable care to secure and uses it to launch an
attack against a third party, the owner of that system may
be liable to the third party for negligence. Experts refer to
this scenario as “downstream liability.” Although a case
has yet to arise in the courts, honeypot operators may be
especially vulnerable to downstream liability claims since it
68

See, e.g., JEROME RADCLIFFE, CYBERLAW 101: A PRIMER ON US LAWS RELATED TO
HONEYPOT DEPLOYMENTS 6-9 (2007), available at http://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/legal/cyberlaw-101-primer-laws-related-honeypot-deployments-1746.
69

See id. at 14-17.

70

See Schaufenbuel, supra note 34, at 16-17 (“Because a hacker finds a honeypot by
actively searching the Internet for vulnerable hosts, and then attacks it without active
encouragement by law enforcement officials, the defense of entrapment is not likely to be
helpful to a hacker.”).
71

See Cole & Northcutt, supra note 67.
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is highly foreseeable that such a system be misused in this
manner.72
Another honeypot risk is the unintended consequence of becoming a
directed target because the honeypot provoked or attracted hackers to the
company that deployed it, which hackers might otherwise have moved on
to easier targets. Another is that an improperly configured honeypot could
ensnare an innocent third party or customer and collect legally-protected
information (such as PII). If that information is not handled according to
applicable law, the owner of the honeypot could incur statutory liabilities
therefor.73 And yet another scenario is one that, perhaps, only a lawyer
would recognize as a risk: “[i]f you have a honeypot and do learn a lot
from it but don’t remedy or correct it, then there’s a record that is
discoverable and that you knew you had a problem and didn’t [timely] fix
it.”74
[16] Finally, there are uses for honeypots which, when regarded as a
source of revenue by its owners, have the potential to cause substantial
injury to brand image and reputation, and possibly court sanctions: one
law firm has been accused of seeding the very copyrighted content it was
retained to protect, which the firm used as evidence in copyright suits it
prosecuted.75 Because of these alleged activities, the firm has been
72

Schaufenbuel, supra note 34, at 19.

73

See generally id. (stating that the best way for a honeypot owner to avoid downstream
liability is to configure the honeypot to prohibit or limit outbound connections to third
parties).
74

Scott L. Vernick, To Catch a Hacker, Companies Start to Think Like One, FOX
ROTHSCHILD, LLP (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.foxrothschild.com/print/convertToPDF.aspx?path=/newspubs/newspubsprint.
aspx&parms=id|15032388757.
75

See Kevin Parrish, Copyright Troll Busted for Seeding on The Pirate Bay, TOM’S
GUIDE (Aug. 19, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/torrent-pirate-baycopyright-troll-prenda-law-honeypot,news-17391.html#torrent-pirate-bay-copyright-troll-
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labelled a “copyright troll.”76 The allegations, if proved true, also appear
to involve acts of deception, discussed ante, which may subject the firm’s
attorneys to attorney disciplinary proceedings.77 Further, the firm’s
attorneys may incur other possible liabilities, such as vexatious and
frivolous filing sanctions, abuse of process, barratry, or champerty.78
E. Retaliatory Hacking
[17] A common belief for why corporations have little to fear in the
way of prosecution for retaliatory hacking is, “criminals don’t call the
cops.”79 Nevertheless, there is little debate that affirmative retaliatory
hacking is unlawful,80 even if done in the interests of national security.81
prenda-law-honeypot%2Cnews17391.html?&_suid=1396370990577022740795081848747.
76

Id.

77

See id.

78

See, e.g., Sean L. Harrington, Rule 11, Barratry, Champerty, and “Inline Links”,
MINN. ST. BAR ASS’N COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:42 PM),
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2011/01/rule-11-barratry-champerty-and-inlinelinks.html (discussing the vexatious litigation tactics of Righthaven, LLC).
79

See Scott Cohn, Companies Battle Cyberattacks Using ‘Hack Back’, CNBC (June 04,
2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100788881 (“[L]aw enforcement is unlikely to
detect or prosecute a hack back. ‘If the only organization that gets harmed is a number of
criminals’ computers, I don't think it would be of great interest to law enforcement.”);
Aarti Shahani, Tech Debate: Can Companies Hack Back?, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 18,
2013, 5:57 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/18/tech-debate-cancompanieshackback.html (“The Justice Department has not prosecuted any firm for
hacking back and, as a matter of policy, will not say if any criminal investigations are
pending”).
80

See Cohn, supra note 79 (statement of Professor Joel Reidenberg) (“‘Reverse hacking
is a felony in the United States, just as the initial hacking was. It's sort of like, if someone
steals your phone, it doesn't mean you're allowed to break into their house and take it
back.’”); Shahani, supra note 79 (statement of David Wilson) (“‘No, it’s not legal, not
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Although there may be “little debate,” there is debate.82 The views of
many passionate information security analysts could be summed up by
authors John Strand and Paul Asadoorian, who argue, “[c]urrently, our
only defense tools are the same tools we have had for the past 10+ years,
and they are failing.”83 David Willson, the owner and president of Titan
Info Security Group, and a retired Army JAG, contends that using
“automated tools outside of your own network to defend against attacks by
innocent but compromised machines” is not gaining unauthorized access
or a computer trespass, and he asks, “[i]f it is, how is it different from the
adware, spam, cookies, or others that load on your machine without your
knowledge, or at least with passive consent?”84 Willson provides a typical
scenario and then examines the statutory language of the CFAA and offers
some possible arguments—but notes his arguments bear stretch marks
unless the blackmailer gave permission. . . . But who’s going to report it? Not the bad
guy.’”).
81

See, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man
Who Tried to Stop Them), TIME (Sept. 5, 2005),
http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/05au/readings/titan.rain.htm
(discussing the “rogue” counter-hacking activities of Shawn Carpenter, who was working
with the FBI and for whose activities Carpenter claimed the FBI considered prosecuting
him).
82

See Dilanian, supra note 7 (“Others, including Stewart Baker, former NSA general
counsel, said the law does allow hacking back in self-defense. A company that saw its
stolen data on a foreign server was allowed to retrieve it, Baker argued.”) (In preparation
for this comment, the author asked Mr. Baker about the interview, and he replied, “[T]he
LA Times interview didn’t involve me talking about a particular case where retrieving
data was legal. I was arguing that it should be legal.”).
83

JOHN STRAND ET AL., OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES: THE ART OF ACTIVE DEFENSE
207 (2013).
84

David Willson, Hacking Back in Self Defense: Is It Legal; Should It Be?, GLOBAL
KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://blog.globalknowledge.com/technology/security/hacking-cybercrime/hacking-backin-self-defense-is-it-legal-should-it-be/.

22

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

(and he makes no offer of indemnification should practitioners decide to
use them).85
[18] Willson is not alone in searching for leeway within the CFAA.
Stewart Baker, former NSA general counsel, argues on his blog,
Does the CFAA, prohibit counterhacking? The use of the
words “may be illegal,” and “should not” are a clue that the
law is at best ambiguous. . . . [V]iolations of the CFAA
depend on “authorization.” If you have authorization, it’s
nearly impossible to violate the CFAA . . . [b]ut the CFAA
doesn’t define “authorization.” . . . The more difficult
question is whether you’re “authorized” to hack into the
attacker’s machine to extract information about him and to
trace your files. As far as I know, that question has never
been litigated, and Congress’s silence on the meaning of
“authorization” allows both sides to make very different
arguments. . . . [C]omputer hackers won’t be bringing
many lawsuits against their victims. The real question is
whether victims can be criminally prosecuted for breaking
into their attacker’s machine.86
Other theories —and assorted arguments bearing stretch marks—
analogize retaliatory hacking as subject to the recapture of chattels
privilege,87 entry upon land to remove chattels,88 private necessity,89 or
85

See id.

86

Stewart Baker, The Hack Back Debate (Nov. 02, 2012)
http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/.
87

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 22 (5th ed.
1984).
88

See id.
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even the castle doctrine.90 Jassandra K. Nanini, a cybersecurity law
specialist, suggests applying the “security guard doctrine” as an analogy.91
She posits that, if private actors act independently of law enforcement and
have a valid purpose for their security activities that remains separate from
law enforcement, then incidental use of evidence gained through those
activities by law enforcement is permissible, even if the security guard
acted unreasonably (as long as he remained within the confines of the
purpose of his employer’s interests).92 As applied, Nanini explains the
analogy as follows:
If digital property were considered the same as physical,
cyber security guards could “patrol” client networks in
search of intruder footprints, and based on sufficient
evidence of a breach by a particular hacker, perhaps
indicated by the user’s ISP, initiate a breach of the
invader’s network in order to search for compromised data
and disable its further use. Even more aggressive attacks
designed to plant malware in hacker networks could be
considered seizure of an offensive weapon, comparable to a
school security guard seizing a handgun from a malicious
party. Such proactive defense could use the hacker’s own
malware to corrupt his systems when he attempts to
retrieve the data from the company’s system. Certainly all
89

See id. at § 24.

90

See id. at § 21. And see McGee, Sabett, & Shah, supra, note 18 (“Reaching consensus
on applying the concepts of self-defense to the cyber domain has proven to be a difficult
task, though not for the lack of trying”).
91

See Jassandra Nanini, China, Google, and Private Security: Can Hack-Backs Provide
the Missing Defense in Cybersecurity, (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14-15) (on file
with author).
92

See id. (manuscript at 14).
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of these activities are within the scope of the company’s
valid interest, which include maintaining data integrity,
preventing use of stolen data, and disabling further attack. .
. . Similarly, companies may wholly lack any consideration
of collecting evidence for legal recourse, keeping in step
with the private interest requirement of the private security
guard doctrine in general. All hack-backs could be
executed without any support or direction from law
enforcement, opening the door to utilization of evidence in
a future prosecution against the hacker. 93
The foregoing theories notwithstanding, what is clear is that obtaining
evidence by use of a keylogger, spyware, or persistent cookies likely is
violative of state and federal laws, such as the CFAA or ECPA.94 The
CFAA, last amended in 2008, criminalizes anyone who commits, attempts
to commit, or conspires to commit an offense under the Act, including
offenses such as knowingly accessing without authorization a protected
computer (for delineated purposes) or intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization (for separately delineated purposes).95 Relevant
statutory phrases, such as “without authorization” and “access,” have been
the continuing subject of appellate review.96 One federal court, referring
93

Id. (manuscript at 15-16).

94

See Sean Harrington, Why Divorce Lawyers Should Get Up to Speed on CyberCrime
Law, MINN. ST. B. ASS’N COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:40 PM),
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2010/03/why-divorce-lawyers-should-get-up-to-speedon-cybercrime-law.html (collecting cases regarding unauthorized computer access).
95

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see Clements-Jeffrey v. Springfield, 810 F. Supp. 2d 857,
874 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“It is one thing to cause a stolen computer to report its IP address
or its geographical location in an effort to track it down. It is something entirely different
to violate federal wiretapping laws by intercepting the electronic communications of the
person using the stolen laptop.”).
96

See generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1624–42 (2003)
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to both the ECPA and CFAA, pointed out that “the histories of these
statutes reveal specific Congressional goals—punishing destructive
hacking, preventing wiretapping for criminal or tortious purposes,
securing the operations of electronic communication service providers—
that are carefully embodied in these criminal statutes and their
corresponding civil rights of action.”97 At least one court has held that the
use of persistent tracking cookies is a violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.98 Congress is currently considering reform
to the CFAA, as well as comprehensive privacy legislation that would, in
some circumstances, afford a private right of action to consumers whose
personal information is collected without their consent. 99
[19] Regardless of the frequency with which retaliatory hacking charges
have been brought, one issue that has not yet been included in the debate
involves illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible. This matters
because bringing suit under the CFAA or ECPA is a remedy that corporate
victims have recently invoked increasingly.100
(showing how and why courts have construed unauthorized access statutes in an overly
broad manner that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct
involving computers).
97

In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis
added).
98

See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 13 & 21-22 (1st Cir. 2003)
(holding use of tracking cookies to intercept electronic communications was within the
meaning of the ECPA, because the acquisition occurred simultaneously with the
communication).
99

See Peter J. Toren, Amending the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, BNA (Apr. 9,
2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/amending-thecomputer-fraud-and-abuse-act/.
100

See, e.g., Holly R. Rogers & Katharine V. Hartman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: A Weapon Against Employees Who Steal Trade Secrets, BNA (June 21, 2011)
(“[E]mployers are increasingly using this cause of action to go after former employees
who steal trade secrets from their company-issued computers.”).
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[20] Another liability —the one most frequently cited— is that of
misattribution and collateral damage:
[E]ncouraging digital vigilantes will only make the
mayhem worse. Hackers like to cover their tracks by
routing attacks through other people’s computers, without
the owners’ knowledge. That raises the alarming prospect
of collateral damage to an innocent bystander’s systems:
imagine the possible consequences if the unwitting host of
a battle between hackers and counter-hackers were a
hospital’s computer.101
Likewise, Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), sponsor for the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) and Chair of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, warned private corporations
against going on the offensive as part of their cyber security programs:
“You don't want to attack the wrong place or disrupt the wrong place for
somebody who didn't perpetrate a crime.”102 Contemplate the civil
101

A Byte for a Byte, ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21583268/; see also Lewis, supra note 21 (“There is
also considerable risk that amateur cyber warriors will lack the skills or the judgment to
avoid collateral damage. A careless attack could put more than the intended target at
risk. A nation has sovereign privileges in the use of force. Companies do not.”); John
Reed, The Cyber Security Recommendations of Blair and Huntsman's Report on Chinese
IP Theft, COMPLEX FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2012),
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/22/the_cyber_security_recomendations_
of_blair_and huntsman_report_on_chinese_ip_theft (“While it may be nice to punch back
at a hacker and take down his or her networks or even computers, there's a big potential
for collateral damage, especially if the hackers are using hijacked computers belonging to
innocent bystanders.”).
102

John Reed, Mike Rogers: Cool It with Offensive Cyber Ops, COMPLEX FOREIGN POL’Y
(Dec. 14, 2012, 5:07 PM),
http:/complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/14/mike_rogers_cool_it_with_offensive_
cyber_ops (audio recording of full speech available at http://www.c-
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liabilities that one could incur if, in an effort to take down a botnet through
self-help and vigilantism, the damaged computers belonged to customers,
competitors, or competitors’ customers. Aside from the financial losses
and injury to brand reputation and goodwill, implicated financial
institutions could expect increased regulatory scrutiny and could
compromise government contracts subject to FISMA.
[21] Yet another frequently discussed liability is that of escalation:
cybercrime is perpetrated by many different attacker profiles of persons
and entities, including cyber-terrorists, cyber-spies, cyber-thieves, cyberwarriors, and cyber-hactivists.103 Because the purported motivation of a
cyber-hactivist is principle, retaliation by the corporate victim may be
received as an invitation to return fire and escalate.
Similarly,
“[e]ncouraging corporations to compete with the Russian mafia or Chinese
military hackers to see who can go further in violating the law . . . is not a
contest American companies can win.”104 Conversely, the motivation of a
cyber-thief is principal and interest, so retaliation by the target might be
taken as a suggestion to move on to an easier target. Because the
perpetrators are usually anonymous, the corporate victim has no way to
make a risk-based and proportional response premised upon the
classification of the attacker as nation-state, thief, or hactivist.

span.org/video?314114-1/rep-rogers-rmi-addresses-cyber-threats-economy). But see See
McGee, Sabett, & Shah, supra, note 18 (urging the adoption of a “Framework for ‘good
enough’ attribution”).
103

For definitions and discussion of these terms, see ERIC A. FISCHER ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42984, THE 2013 CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER: OVERVIEW
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2-4, (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42984.pdf.
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Max Fisher, Should the U.S. Allow Companies to ‘Hack Back’ Against Foreign Cyber
Spies?, WASH. POST (May 23, 2013, 10:43 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/23/should-the-u-s-allowcompanies-to-hack-back-against-foreign-cyber-spies/ (quoting Lewis, supra, note 21).
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[I]n cyberspace attribution is a little harder. On the
playground you can see the person who hit you . . . well,
almost always[,] . . . in cyberspace we can track IP
addresses and TTPs from specific threat actors, which
smart analysts and researchers tell us is a viable way to
perform attribution. I agree with them, largely, but there’s
a fault there. An IP address belonging to China SQL
injecting your enterprise applications is hardly a smoking
gun that Chinese APTs are after you. Attackers have been
using others’ modus operandi to mask their identities for as
long as spy games have been played. Attackers have been
known to use compromised machines and proxies in hostile
countries for as long as I can remember caring—to “bounce
through” to attack you. Heck, many of the attacks that
appear to be originating from nation-states that we suspect
are hacking us may very well be coming from a hacker at
the coffee house next door to your office, using multiple
proxies to mask their true origin. This is just good OpSec,
and attackers use this method all the time, let’s not kid
ourselves.105
If, without conclusive attribution and intelligence, the corporate victim is
unable to make a risk-based and proportional response, it may be
reasonable to question whether retaliatory hacking is abandoning the riskbased approach to business problems exhorted by FFIEC,106 PCI,107 and

105

Los, supra note 19.
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See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Layered Security Essential Tactic of Latest FFIEC Banking
Guidelines, EWEEK (June 30, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/ITInfrastructure/Layered-Security-Essential-Tactic-of-Latest-FFIEC-Banking-Guidelines557743/ (“Banks must adopt a layered approach to security in order to combat highly
sophisticated cyber-attacks, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council said
in a supplement released June 28. The new rules update the 2005 ‘Authentication in an
Internet Banking Environment’ guidance to reflect new security measures banks need to
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the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?108 “If we start using those sort of
[cyber weapons], it doesn't take much to turn them against us, and we are
tremendously vulnerable,” said Howard Schmidt, a former White House
cyber security coordinator.109
[22] Then there is the often overlooked issue of professional ethics—
not for the attorney—but for the information security professional.
“Ethics,” a term derived from the ancient Greek ethikos (ἠθικός), has been
defined as “a custom or usage.”110 Modernly, ethics is understood to be
“[professional] norms shared by a group on a basis of mutual and usually
reciprocal recognition.”111 The codes of ethics provide articulable
principles against which one’s decision-making is objectively measured,
and serve other important interests, including presenting an image of

fend off increasingly sophisticated attacks. . . . The guidance . . . emphasized a risk-based
approach in which controls are strengthened as risks increase.”).
107

See PCI 2.0 Encourages Risk-Based Process: Three Things You Need to Know,
ITGRC (Aug. 23, 2010), http://itgrcblog.com/2010/08/23/pci-2-0-encourages-risk-basedprocess-three-things-you-need-to-know/.
108

See Lee Vorthman, IT Security: NIST's Cybersecurity Framework, NETAPP (July 16,
2013, 6:01 AM), https://communities.netapp.com/community/netapp-blogs/governmentgurus/blog/2013/07/16/it-security-nists-cybersecurity-framework) (“It is widely
anticipated that the Cybersecurity Framework will improve upon the current
shortcomings of FISMA by adopting several controls for continuous monitoring and by
allowing agencies to move away from compliance-based assessments towards a real-time
risk-based approach.”).
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available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/252.
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prestige and credibility for the organization and the profession,112
eliminating unfair competition,113 and fostering cooperation among
professionals.114
[23] Many information security professionals are certified by the
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium
((ISC)2®). The (ISC)2® Committee has recognized its responsibility to
provide guidance for “resolving good versus good, and bad versus bad,
dilemmas,” and “to encourage right behavior.”115 The Committee also has
the responsibility to discourage certain behaviors, such as raising
unnecessary alarm, fear, uncertainty, or doubt; giving unwarranted
112

See generally HEINZ C. LUEGENBIEHL & MICHAEL DAVIS, ENGINEERING CODES OF
ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS 10 (1986) (referring to the “Contract with society”
theory on the relation between professions and codes of ethics).
According to this approach, a code of ethics is one of those things a
group must have before society will recognize it as a profession. The
contents of the code are settled by considering what society would
accept in exchange for such benefits of professionalism as high income
and high prestige. A code is a way to win the advantages society grants
only to those imposing certain restraints on themselves.
Id.
113

See, e.g., OFFICIAL (ISC)2 GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 1214 (Steven Hernandez ed., 3d
ed. 2013) (“The code helps to protect professionals from certain stresses and pressures
(such as the pressure to cut corners with information security to save money) by making
it reasonably likely that most other members of the profession will not take advantage of
the resulting conduct of such pressures. An ethics code also protects members of a
profession from certain consequences of competition, and encourages cooperation and
support among the professionals.”).
114

See id.
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(ISC)2, (ISC)2 OVERVIEW: EVOLVING IN TODAY’S COMPLEX SECURITY LANDSCAPE 4
(2013), available at
www.infosec.co.uk/_novadocuments/47180?v=635294483175930000.
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comfort or reassurance; consenting to bad practice; attaching weak
systems to the public network; professional association with nonprofessionals; professional recognition of, or association with, amateurs;
or associating or appearing to associate with criminals or criminal
behavior.116 Therefore, an information security professional bound by this
code who undertakes active defense activities that he or she knows or
should know are unlawful, or proceeds where the legality of such behavior
not clear, may be in violation the Code.
[24] It would stand to reason that, an organization that empowers,
directs, or acquiesces to conduct by its employees that violates the (ISC)
Code of Ethics may violate its own corporate ethics or otherwise
compromise its ethical standing in the corporate community—or not:
when Google launched a “secret counter-offensive” and “managed to gain
access to a computer in Taiwan that it suspected of being the source of the
attacks,”117 tech sources praised Google’s bold action.118
[25] Nevertheless, corporate ethics is an indispensable consideration in
the hack back debate. The code of ethics and business conduct for
financial institutions should reflect and reinforce corporate values,
including uncompromising integrity, respect, responsibility and good
citizenship. As noted above, retaliatory hacking is deceptive and has been
characterized as reckless, and even Web bugs are commonly associated
with spammers. Corporate management must consider whether resorting
to techniques pioneered by and associated with criminals or spammers has
116

See id.
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David E. Sanger & John Markoff, After Google’s Stand on China, U.S. Treads
Lightly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15diplo.html?_r=0.
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See, e.g., Skipper Eye, Google Gives Chinese Hackers a Tit for Tat, REDMOND PIE
(Jan. 16, 2010), available at http://www.redmondpie.com/google-gives-chinese-hackersa-tit-for-tat-9140352/.
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the potential to compromise brand image in the eyes of existing and
prospective customers. Similarly, to the extent that financial corporations
are engaging in active defense covertly,119 corporate management must
consider whether customers’ confidence in the security of their data and
investments could be shaken when such activities are uncovered. Will
customers wonder whether their data has been placed at risk because of
escalation? Will shareholders question whether such practices are within
the scope of good corporate stewardship?

III. ALTERNATIVES TO RETALIATORY HACKING
[26] The obvious argument in support of active defense is that the law
and governments are doing little to protect private corporations and
persons from cybercrime, which has inexorably resulted in resort to selfhelp,120 and those who vociferously counsel to refrain from active defense
often have little advice on alternatives. At the risk of pointing out the
obvious, one counsels, “‘when you look at active defense, we need to
focus on reducing our vulnerabilities.’”121
[27] Alternatives to hacking back are evolving, and one of the more
promising is the pioneering threat intelligence gathering and sharing from
the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (“FS119

See Shelley Boose, Black Hat Survey: 36% of Information Security Professionals
Have Engaged in Retaliatory Hacking, BUSINESSWIRE (June 26, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120726006045/en/Black-Hat-Survey-36Information-Security-Professionals (“When asked ‘Have you ever engaged in retaliatory
hacking?’ 64% said ‘never,’ 23% said ‘once,’ and 13% said ‘frequently”. . . . [W]e
should take these survey results with a grain of salt . . . . It’s safe to assume some
respondents don’t want to admit they use retaliatory tactics.”).
120
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ISAC”), which collects information about threats and vulnerabilities from
its 4,400 FI members, government partners, and special relationships with
Microsoft®, iSIGHT PartnersSM, Secunia, et al., anonymizes the data, and
distributes it back to members.122 In addition to e-mail alerts and a Web
portal, FS-ISAC holds regular tele-conferences during which vulnerability
and threat information is discussed, and during which presentations on
current topics are given.123 The FS-ISAC recently launched a security
automation project to eliminate manual processes to collect and distribute
cyber threat information, according to Bill Nelson, the Center’s director.124
The objective of the project is to significantly reduce operating costs and
lower fraud losses for financial institutions, by consuming threat
information on a real-time basis.125
[28] Although, as American Banker wryly observes, “[b]ankers have
never been too keen on sharing secrets with one another,” 126 dire
122

See About FS-ISAC, FIN. SERV.: INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CENTER,
https://www.fsisac.com/about (last visited June 9, 2014). Launched in 1999, FS-ISAC
was established by the financial services sector in response to 1998's Presidential
Directive 63. That directive ― later updated by 2003's Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 ― mandated that the public and private sectors share information about
physical and cyber security threats and vulnerabilities to help protect the U.S. critical
infrastructure. See id.
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See id.

124

FS-ISAC Security Automation Working Group Continues to Mature Automated Threat
Intelligence Strategy, Deliver on Multi-Year Roadmap, FIN. SERV.: INFO. SHARING &
ANALYSIS CENTER (Feb. 26, 2014),
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circumstances have catalyzed a new era of cooperation, paving the way for
the success of the cooperative model developed by the FS-ISAC—even
before its current ambitious automation project, which has resulted in
successful botnet takedown operations.127 An illustrative example is the
Citadel malware botnet takedown, where Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit,
in collaboration with the FS-ISAC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the American Bankers Association, NACHA—The Electronic Payments
Association, and others, executed a simultaneous operation to disrupt
more than 1,400 Citadel botnets reportedly responsible for over half a
billion dollars in losses worldwide.128 With the assistance of U.S.
Marshals, data and evidence, including servers, were seized from data
hosting facilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and was made possible
by a court ordered civil seizure warrant from a U.S. federal court.129
Microsoft also reported that it shared information about the botnets’
operations with international Computer Emergency Response Teams,
which can deal with elements of the botnets outside U.S. jurisdiction, and
the FBI informed enforcement agencies in those countries.130 Similar,
more recent, operations include one characterized as “major takedown of
the Shylock Trojan botnet,” which botnet is described as “an advanced
cybercriminal infrastructure attacking online banking systems around the
world,” that reportedly was coordinated by the UK National Crime
Agency (NCA), and included Europol, the FBI, BAE Systems Applied
127

See generally, Taking Down Botnets: Public and Private Efforts to Disrupt and
Dismantle Cybercriminal Networks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (July 15, 2014) http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/taking-downbotnets_public-and-private-efforts-to-disrupt-and-dismantle-cybercriminal-networks
(providing access to testimony from the hearing).
128
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129
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Intelligence, Dell SecureWorks, Kaspersky Lab and the UK's GCHQ,131
and another takedown operation that targeted the much-feared
Cryptolocker.132 Following the FS-ISAC model, the retail sector has
taken the “historic decision” to share data on cyber-threats for the first
time through a newly-formed Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center (RCISC),133 and the financial services and retail sectors formed a crosspartnership.134
[29] Finally, at the time of this publication, a draft Cybersecurity
Information-Sharing Act of 2014, advanced by Chairman Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) and ranking member Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), was
passed out of the Senate Intelligence on a 12-3 vote, and is expected to be
put to a vote in the full Senate.135 The bill is designed to enhance and
131
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http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/39289/nca-leads-global-shylock-malwaretakedown/.
132

See Gregg Keizer, Massive Botnet Takedown Stops Spread of Cryptolocker
Ransomware, COMPUTERWORLD (June 5, 2014 02:15 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9248872/Massive_botnet_takedown_stops_spre
ad_of_Cryptolocker_ransomware.
133
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provide liability protections for information sharing between private
corporate entities, between private corporate entities and the Government,
and between Government agencies.
[30] Yet another promising option is the partnership that critical
infrastructure institutions have formed, or should investigate forming, with
ISPs. For example, ISPs currently provide DDoS mitigation services that,
although not particularly effective in application vulnerability (OSI model
layer 7) attacks, are very capable in responding to volume-based
attacks.136 One senior ISP executive proposed to this author, under the
Chatham House Rule,137 the possibility that ISPs may be able to provide
aggregated threat intelligence information, including attribution, based
upon monitoring of the entirety of its networks (not merely the network
traffic to and from an individual corporate client).
[31] ISPs’ capabilities are, however, subject both to statutory and
regulatory limitations, including, for example, the Cable Act,138 and
136

See BRENT ROWE ET AL., THE ROLE OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IN CYBER
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proposed rules that would restrict the blocking of “lawful content,
applications, services, or non-harmful devices,” that may appear to
implicate liability-incurring discretion.139
[32] Nevertheless, several researchers urge that ISPs should assume a
“larger security role,” and are in a good position “to cost-effectively
prevent certain types of malicious cyber behavior, such as the operation of
botnets on home users’ and small businesses’ computers.”140 Likewise,
the Federal Communications Commission has defined “legitimate network
management” as including “ensuring network security and integrity” and
managing traffic unwanted by end users:
In the context of broadband Internet access services,
techniques to ensure network security and integrity are
designed to protect the access network and the Internet
against actions by malicious or compromised end systems.
Examples include spam, botnets, and distributed denial of
service attacks.
Unwanted traffic includes worms,
malware, and virus that exploit end-user system
vulnerabilities; denial of service attacks; and spam.141
N.B., a 2010 study found that just ten ISPs accounted for 30 percent of IP
addresses sending out spam worldwide.142 And, in 2011, it was reported
privacy provision of the Communications Act to cover interactive services provided by
cable operators. Id.
139
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that over 80% of infected machines were located within networks of ISPs,
and that fifty ISPs control about 50% of all botnet infected machines
worldwide.143
[33] Other options that some companies have pursued as alternatives to
the pitfalls of inherently risky threat counter-intelligence gathering
discussed above include risk transfer or automated monitoring, both of
which rely on outside vendors or subscription services.
[34] Under the risk transfer approach, a corporate entity may choose to
rely on the findings of a private contractor or company without undue
concern for how the contractor or firm acquired the information. U.S.
companies already outsource threat intelligence gathering to firms who
employ operatives in Israel, such as IBM-Trusteer and RSA,144 ostensibly
because these operatives are able to effectively obtain information without
running afoul of U.S. law. For legal scholars, perhaps a case to help justify
this approach might be that of the famous Pentagon Papers (New York
Times v. United States), in which the Supreme Court held that the public’s
right to know was superior to the Government’s need to maintain secrecy
of the information, notwithstanding that the leaked documents were
obtained unlawfully (i.e., in alleged violation of § 793 of the Espionage
Act).145 Yet, a corporate entity that knowingly—or with blissful
ignorance—retains the services resulting from unethical conduct or
conduct that would be criminal if undertaken in the U.S. may nevertheless
suffer injury to the brand resulting from revelations of the vendor’s
actions.
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[35] Under the automated monitoring approach, corporate entities rely
on vendor subscription services, such as Internet Identity (IID™), that use
automated software to monitor various fora or social media sites for the
occurrence of keywords, concepts, or sentiment, and then alert the
customer. Variations of these technologies are in use for high frequency
stock trading and e-Discovery. An example might be detecting the
offering for sale on a site of primary account numbers and related
information by a cyberthief, and providing real-time notification to the
merchant so that the accounts can be disabled.
[36] Other promising options include “big data” approach, which is to
employ data scientists and software and hardware automation in-house to
draw more meaningful inferences from the data and evidence already
legally within the company’s custody and control. For example, David
Bianco, a “network hunter” for security firm FireEye, suggests allocating
resources for detecting, evaluating, and treating threat indicators according
to their value to the attacker, which he represents in his so-called
“Pyramid of Pain.”146 Under this model, remediation efforts are directed
toward those indicators that are costly (in time or resources) to the
attacker, requiring the attacker to change strategy or incur more costs.147
Bianco proposed this model after concluding that organizations seem to
blindly collect and aggregate indicators, without making the best use of
them.148 Vendors, such as Guardian Analytics,149 FireEye’s Threat
Analytics Program,150 CrowdStrike’s Falcon platform,151 and HP’s
146
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Autonomy IDOL152 (intelligent data operating layer) are endeavoring to
bring real-time threat intelligence parsing or information sharing tools and
services to the marketplace.

IV. CONCLUSION
[37] Hack back or active defense, depending on how one defines
each—and everything in between—consists of activities that are both
lawful and unlawful, and which carry all the business and professional
risks associated with deceptive practices, misattribution, and escalation.
To urge a risk-based approach to using even lawful active defense tactics
would be to state the obvious, and the use of certain types of active
defense where misattribution is possible, may be to entirely abandon the
risk-based approach to problem solving. Moreover, at the time of this
writing, a qualified privilege to hack back through legislative reform
seems unlikely, and would be difficult because the holder of such a
privilege would not only have to establish proper intent, but also
attribution.
However, the tools, technologies, partnerships, and
information sharing between corporations, governments, vendors, and
trade associations are promising; they have already proven effective, and
are steadily improving.
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